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Abstract
This study examines types of democracies that result from trade-offs within the democratic quality. Recently, the existence
and relevance of trade-offs has been widely discussed. The idea is that the functions associated with the quality of democ-
racy cannot all be maximized simultaneously. Thus, trade-offs are expressed in distinct profiles of democracy. Different
profiles of democracy favour certain democracy dimensions over others due to their institutional design. Conceptually, we
differentiate between four different democracy profiles: a libertarian-majoritarian (high political freedom, lower political
equality, and lower political and legal control values), an egalitarian-majoritarian (high equality combined with lower free-
dom and control values), as well as two control-focused democracy profiles (high control values either with high degrees
of freedom or high degrees of equality). We apply a cluster analysis with a focus on cluster validation on the Democracy
Matrix dataset—a customized version of the Varieties-of-Democracy dataset. To increase the robustness of the cluster re-
sults, this study uses several different cluster algorithms, multiple fit indices as well as data resampling techniques. Based
on all democracies between 1900 and 2017, we find strong empirical evidence for these democracy profiles. Finally, we
discuss the temporal development and spatial distribution of the democracy profiles globally across the three waves of
democracy, as well as for individual countries.
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1. Introduction
How can we make sense of all the different institutional
designs of democracies? Ordering the political reality
is an important task of comparative politics. Therefore,
typologies are a useful and necessary tool. Typologies
structure the confusing political reality by reducing em-
pirical complexity and focusing on its most relevant as-
pects. Various efforts have beenmade to capture the fun-
damental institutional choices in the diverse and hetero-
geneous world of democracies (Bogaards, 2017): For ex-
ample, democracies are divided into parliamentary and
presidential systems (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Steffani,
1979), collective and competitive veto points (Birchfield
& Crepaz, 1998; Crepaz & Moser, 2004), decentralized
and centripetal democracies (Gerring & Thacker, 2008),
or nation-state and state-nation institutions (Stepan,
Linz, & Yadav, 2010). The most influential proposal is
Lijphart’s (2012) typology of majoritarian and consensus
democracy which has been much debated and consid-
erably criticized (Bormann, 2010; Fortin, 2008; Giuliani,
2016; Kaiser, 1997; Lauth, 2010).
Recently, the quality of democracy research began to
distinguish between different types or profiles of democ-
racies, concluding that a perfect democracy does not
exist. A democracy cannot perform at its best in all
dimensions and functions simultaneously. Rather “ev-
ery democratic country must make an inherently value-
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laden choice about what kind of democracy it wishes to
be” (Diamond & Morlino, 2004, p. 21). There are trade-
offs between central dimensions and functions of democ-
racy. Thereby, democracies emphasize some dimensions
or functions, while others are necessarily neglected.
Newer measurements of democracies (e.g., Democracy
Barometer, V-Dem) try to explore this idea. On a pre-
liminary basis, the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann,
Merkel, Müller, Giebler, & Weβels, 2012) identifies sev-
eral different clusters of democracies. V-Dem exam-
ines the possibility of trade-offs in their conceptual pa-
pers and highlights the tension between institutions of
the liberal and majoritarian conception of democracy
(Coppedge et al., 2011). However, these democracymea-
sures are not able to measure different democracy pro-
files (e.g., countries can have high degrees of democratic
quality in each dimension).
In this article, we draw on the novel dataset of the
Democracy Matrix (Lauth & Schlenkrich, 2018a) which
is a customized version of the Varieties of Democracy
dataset (Coppedge et al., 2018). It is a measurement
instrument which is not only designed to gauge the
quality of democracy, but also to capture several trade-
offs between dimensions caused by specific institu-
tional choices of the democracies. It proposes vari-
ous trade-offs between three fundamental democracy
dimensions, namely political freedom, political equal-
ity, and political and legal control. Conceptually, the
Democracy Matrix identifies four democracy profiles:
Libertarian-majoritarian democracies stress the freedom
dimension over both the equality and control dimen-
sion; egalitarian-majoritarian democracies focus on the
equality dimension but neglect freedom and control.
In addition, it is possible that there can be a mix be-
tween high freedom and control dimensions (libertarian-
control-focused democracy) as well as a mix between
high equality values and high control values (egalitarian-
controlled-focused democracy). This study applies a clus-
ter analysis with validation strategies to this dataset to
empirically test whether we can find these conceptually
proposed democracy profiles.
This article proceeds as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the conceptualization and measurement of the
Democracy Matrix. Section 3, the methodology section,
presents the multiple steps of the cluster analysis and
the cluster validation strategies. Finally, the results of the
cluster analysis are presented (Section 4) and discussed
(Section 5), followed by a conclusion (Section 6).
2. The Democracy Matrix: Trade-Offs and
Democracy Profiles
2.1. Democracy Conception
How can we reasonably define democracy? In democ-
racy theory, three different conceptual ranges became
apparent: minimal definitions, middle-range definitions,
and maximal definitions. Although there is a large scien-
tific consensus on theminimal definition of democracy—
the repeated holding of elections with competition and
broad participation, it has become clear that a nuanced
view on the quality of democracy, especially for estab-
lished democracies, is not possiblewithin the boundaries
of this definition. Maximal definitions overstretch the
concept of democracy by focusing on socio-economic
outcomes unrelated to the democratic procedureswhich
are the real focus of the analysis (welfare state within
the social democracy concept). However, middle-range
definitions supplement the minimal democracy concept
only insofar as this is necessary for a differentiated anal-
ysis and thus, the definition remains within the limits of
a narrow and procedural understanding of democracy.
The democracy concept of the Democracy Matrix (Lauth,
2015; Lauth & Schlenkrich, 2018a) is based on such a
middle-ranged understanding of democracy.
The Democracy Matrix combines three dimensions
with five central democratic functions: While the dimen-
sion of freedom captures the extent of citizens’ free
self-determination based on civil and political rights,
the equality dimension encompasses legal egalitarian-
ism and the actual realization of those rights (input-
egalitarianism). The control dimension takes into ac-
count the protection of the two other dimensions
through legal control by judiciaries and political oversight
by intermediary institutions, the media, and parliament.
In addition, five key functions cut across these three
dimensions specifying the concept of democracy qual-
ity. The function “procedures of decision” captures the
democratic quality of representative elections and direct
democracy. The “regulation of the intermediate sphere”
analyzes interest aggregation and interest articulation by
parties, interest organizations, and civil society. “Public
Communication” evaluates the functioning of the me-
dia system and the public realm. The function “guar-
antee of rights” analyzes the democratic quality of the
court system, whereas the last function “rules settle-
ment/implementation” focuses on the democratic qual-
ity of the executive and legislative branches’ work. This
produces 15 matrix-fields which guide and support a de-
tailed analysis of the quality of democracy (see Figure 1).
For example, the three matrix fields of the institution
“Public Communication” assess whether the media sys-
tem can freely operate (freedom dimension), whether
interests are equally represented in the public sphere by
diverse media outlets (equality dimension), and finally,
whether the media system is able to criticize and control
the government (control dimension).
Democracies—defined by the Democracy Matrix—
preserve all dimensions of political freedom, political
equality, and political and legal control, as well as main-
tain a democratic functional logic in all five key institu-
tions. It may be that some of its characteristics are only
partially developed as long as the central democratic
functional logic is retained such as in deficient democra-
cies in which elections occur in combination with some
deficits in the rule of law.
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Figure 1. Concept of the DemocracyMatrix. Notes: The dark blue boxes represent the three dimensions and the five central
institutions of the Democracy Matrix. Light blue boxes are the 15 matrix fields, each representing a combination of one
dimension and one institution. The focus of the analysis of the democratic quality for each matrix field is described by the
text in the light blue boxes (e.g., “communicative freedom” is the focus of the matrix field which is part of the institution
“Public Communication” and the freedom dimension). The two-headed arrows represent the derived trade-offs and the
text inside the grey boxes describes the components involved in the trade-off, e.g., there is a trade-off between judicial
review (control dimension) and effective government (freedom dimension). Source: Lauth and Schlenkrich, 2018b.
Thereby, the democracymatrix conceptualizes the in-
ternal relationship of these central dimensions to each
other (Lauth, 2016). It differentiates between comple-
mentary effects and conflicting effects of the democ-
racy dimensions (trade-offs). On the one hand, these di-
mensions reciprocally support one another: Elections are
only meaningful if they are not only competitive but also
allow nearly universal suffrage, or more generally, free-
dom needs a minimum level of equality and vice-versa.
On the other hand, there are tensions between the di-
mensions (Diamond & Morlino, 2004). This means a per-
fect democracy that fully realizes all democracy dimen-
sions cannot exist. Conflicting effects (trade-offs) can
also be understood as a normative dilemma for demo-
cratic societies. They give expression to a political con-
flict over values, on which society must take a position.
Stressing one value, which might have been selected in
a process of negotiation by the different social forces
(Bühlmann et al., 2012, p. 123) orwhich reflects a specific
cultural preference (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015), changes
the degrees of development of the individual dimensions
and their weights relative to one another. The conflicting
effects of the dimensions or trade-offs allow citizens to
shape their democracy according to their normative pref-
erences. As Berlin (2000) states:
Liberty and equality, spontaneity and security, happi-
ness and knowledge, mercy and justice—all these are
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ultimate human values, sought for themselves alone;
yet when they are incompatible, they cannot all be
attained, choices must be made, sometimes tragic
losses accepted in the pursuit of some preferred ul-
timate end. (p. 23)
Trade-offs arise because some democracy concepts (e.g.,
egalitarian vs. libertarian democracy) can be arranged
as opposing pairs and prefer different institutional so-
lutions for the same function. These conceptions have
an equal normative weight and it is equally possible to
justify them. In addition, they are recognized as having
the same level of democracy quality, which means that
the conceptions and their institutional decisions are neu-
tral concerning the quality of democracy. Ultimately, ev-
ery conception of democracy emphasizes different po-
litical values, while others are neglected (e.g., equality
as opposed to freedom). This means that they exhibit
a different dimensional structuring of the same demo-
cratic quality (e.g., equality dimension over the freedom
dimension). Hence, due to their connection to different
conceptions of democracy, institutions emphasize differ-
ent democracy dimensions. The tensions between the
dimensions are reflected in institutional decisions and
one cannot completely realize all three dimensions of the
Democracy Matrix since they are unavoidably bound to
conflicting goals.
The Democracy Matrix differentiates between two
opposing pairs of democracy conceptions. The first pair
tackles the levels of effectiveness of the government or
the conflicting relationship between the freedom and
control dimension: Is the decision-making process sep-
arated between the different powers which control the
government and does the government have to rely on
a broad consensus? Or is there a higher level of free-
dom for the government through its centralized power?
This follows the idea of a distinction between majoritar-
ian and consensus democracies (Lijphart, 2012) which
are opposing concepts of democracy and cannot be re-
alized simultaneously. The former focuses on majority
rule, the latter on an extended system of reciprocal
mechanisms of oversight. Whereas consensus democ-
racy emphasizes the interplay of several veto players
(Tsebelis, 2002), which restrict the action of govern-
ments (e.g., strong second chambers, coalitions, consti-
tutional courts), the ideal-typical development of ma-
joritarian democratic structures favours effective govern-
ment, that is structures with more limited capacities for
oversight. Consensus democracy can also be understood
as a constitutional democracy, whose core element is
a strong constitutional court. Popular legislative initia-
tives are included as a further trade-off element. To
emphasize the dimension involved in this trade-off, we
call these typesmajoritarian and control-focused democ-
racy profiles.
The second opposition is the gap between liber-
tarian and egalitarian conceptions of democracy which
represent the tension between freedom and equality.
This trade-off captures the inclusiveness of access to
the government or political influence. Whereas egalitar-
ian democracies underscore political equality, libertarian
democracy focuses on the realization of political free-
dom. Egalitarian democracies emphasize inclusiveness
by the introduction of equal representation and an equal
chance of representation through PR-systems, egalitar-
ian political finance, and fair media regulation. To the
contrary, libertarian democracies are considered to be
more exclusive with their FPTP-system and their “lack
of restrictions on expenditure and contributions, market
principles of access to themedia [and] no public funding”
(Smilov, 2008, p. 3).
Both opposing pairs can be combined and displayed
in a two-by-two matrix (as seen in Table 1).
Moreover, these two opposing pairs of democracy
conceptions resemble, on the one hand, the democracy
models of decentralism and centripetalism (Gerring &
Thacker, 2008; Gerring, Thacker, & Moreno, 2005) and,
on the other hand, the distinction between collective
and competitive veto points (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998).
Gerring and Thacker differentiate between two funda-
mental aspects; authority and inclusion. While the trade-
off between freedom and control encompasses the as-
pect of authority which “indicates the extent to which
political institutions centralize constitutional sovereignty
within a democratic framework” (Gerring & Thacker,
2008, p. 16), the trade-off between freedom and equal-
Table 1. Democracy profiles.
Effective Government
(Freedom vs. Control)
High Low
Inclusiveness
(Freedom vs. Equality)
High Egalitarian and majoritarian Egalitarian and controlled-democracy (FEc) focused democracy (fEC)
Low Libertarian and majoritarian Libertarian and controlled-democracy (Fec) focused democracy (FeC)
Notes: The letters in brackets represent the three central dimensions of democracy, namely freedom (F), equality (E), and control (C).
An upper-case letter instead of a lower-case letter indicates that the dimension is pronounced relative to the other dimensions. For ex-
ample, the abbreviation Fec stands for a democracy that emphasizes the freedom dimension at the expense of the equality and control
dimensions.
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ity is similar to the inclusion element which “indicates
the extent to incorporate a diversity of interests, ideas,
and identities in the process of governance” (Gerring
& Thacker, 2008, p. 16). Translating our democracy pro-
files to the types developed by Gerring and Thacker,
libertarian-majoritarian democracies correspond to the
centralized democracies (high authority, low inclusion),
egalitarian-majoritarian democracies resemble the cen-
tripetal model (high authority, high inclusion), and fi-
nally, the controlled-focused democracies (either in a
libertarian but more in an egalitarian way) are quite
similar to the decentralized democracies (low authority,
high inclusion).
We can also link these considerations to the differen-
tiation between collective and competitive veto points.
Whereas collective veto points result “from institutions
where the different political actors operate in the same
body and whose members interact with each other on
a face to face basis” (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998, p. 182),
competitive veto points emergewhen the power is “insti-
tutional diffused” (Crepaz & Moser, 2004, p. 266) in sep-
arate institutions between different political actors. On
the one hand, the trade-offs between the freedom and
control dimensions, especially the components of bicam-
eralism and the divided government, represent the com-
petitive veto points. On the other hand, the trade-offs
between the freedom and equality dimension, especially
the element of the electoral system, approximate the
theoretical underpinnings of the collective veto points.
Overall, the Democracy Matrix is able to incorporate
and represent these diverse democracy conceptions by
drawing on the idea of trade-offs between central dimen-
sions of democracy.
2.2. Measurement
How is this democracy conception and its respec-
tive democracy profiles measured? We use the
data from the Democracy Matrix Dataset V1.1 (see
www.democracymatrix.com). The Democracy Matrix
is a customized version of the Varieties-of-Democracy
(V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al., 2018). V-Dem offers
over 400 key indicators for determining democracy qual-
ity, covering a period from 1900 to 2017 (as of March
2019) and including approximately 200 countries. The
data is collected according to an elaborate procedure
and is subject to statistical tests to increase the reliabil-
ity and validity of the assessments. Calculations in this
article are based on version 8 of the V-Dem dataset (as
of March 2019). The development of the Democracy
Matrix is designed according to the state of the art for
measurement concepts, made up of three phases; con-
ceptualization, measurement, and aggregation (Munck
& Verkuilen, 2002).
Thereby, theDemocracyMatrix dataset not onlymea-
sures each individual matrix field but also provides data
for the matrix fields aggregated into dimensions and in-
stitutions (see Figure 1). In contrast to other democracy
indices, the Democracy Matrix explicitly considers the in-
tegration of trade-offs in the measurement stage by ap-
plying a two-step measurement strategy (Lauth, 2016):
Quality measuring indicators consist of the usual indica-
tors used by various democracy measures, while trade-
off measuring indicators measure the conflicting impact
of the dimensions within the Democracy Matrix. The for-
mer indicators are linear in the sense that higher val-
ues indicate a higher democracy quality. The latter are
bipolar which means that each end of the scalar indi-
cates a highly developed characteristic of the profile.
Therefore, maximum values are not possible simultane-
ously in each dimension. The conflicting effects are not
characterized by generally differing degrees of demo-
cratic quality, but rather by the distribution of democ-
racy quality in different dimensions. Trade-off indicators
represent the differences in the shape of these dimen-
sions to each other. A libertarian-majoritarian and an
egalitarian-majoritarian democracy have a different pro-
file, but they could have the same democratic quality.
For example, the freedom dimension of the insti-
tution “Public Communication” is measured as follows:
The matrix field is conceptually based on the idea
of communicative freedoms which is made up of the
two components “freedom of the press” and “free-
dom of opinion.” These two elements are measured
by seven V-Dem indicators in total. The first compo-
nent, freedom of the press, is the average of the three
indicators “Harassment of journalists” (v2meharjrn),
“Government censorship effort” (v2mecenefm), and
“Internet censorship effort” (v2mecenefi). The freedom
of opinion component is the average of the four in-
dicators “Freedom of discussion—women” (v2cldiscw),
“Freedom of discussion—men” (v2cldiscm), “Freedomof
Religion” (v2clrelig), and “Freedom of academic and cul-
tural expression” (v2clacfree). Finally, both components
are scaled between 0 and 1 and are multiplied together
in the sense of necessary conditions to derive the final
value for this matrix field. These values are linear in the
sense that higher values indicate a higher level of quality
of democracy in this matrix field. All other matrix fields
are measured similarly so that the Democracy Matrix
applies approximately a selection of 100 V-Dem indica-
tors. This is the first step of the measurement strategy:
These quality measuring indicators are the basis for the
regime classification and the subsequent trade-off mea-
surement if the country is classified as a democracy.
Furthermore, the Democracy Matrix locates the fol-
lowing trade-off between the freedom and the equal-
ity dimension in the institution “Public Communication”:
Libertarian Media Access versus Egalitarian Media
Access. Whereas libertarian media access is character-
ized by the fact that “it only provides formarket access to
the media” (Smilov, 2008, p. 9, emphasis in the original),
the egalitarian model relies on free airtime and restric-
tions on the purchase of additional media airtime. This
trade-off is theweighted average of the threeV-Dem indi-
cators “Election paid interest group media” (v2elpaidig),
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“Election paid campaign advertisements” (v2elpdcamp),
and “Election free campaign media” (v2elfrcamp). These
combined indicators are then transformed in a bipolar
way: If there are no restrictions, they provide higher val-
ues for the freedom dimension (up until 1) and lower val-
ues for the equality dimension (down until 0.75 which
is the threshold of a working democracy). And vice-
versa, the more regulation exists, the higher the value
for the equality dimension (up until 1) and the lower
the value for the freedom dimension (down until 0.75).
Afterwards, these values are multiplied with the values
for the quality measurement of the first step. This ap-
plies to all thematrix fieldswhere a trade-off is identified.
This produces the final values for the trade-off measure-
ment stage.
3. Research Design: Multi-Step Cluster Analysis
Can we empirically detect these democracy profiles in
the data? Do countries have similar democracy profiles?
To answer these questions, we apply a cluster analy-
sis with a strong focus on cluster validation to trade-
off measurement data of the Democracy Matrix dataset.
Cluster analysis classifies observations using data in form
of variables (features) and different cluster algorithms
(Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011; Hastie, Tibshirani,
& Friedman, 2009; James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani,
2013; Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005). Cluster analysis
can be seen as a form of exploratory data analysis be-
cause it reveals structures in the formof groupingswithin
the data. Validation is an important aspect of cluster
analysis, as different cluster solutions are often possi-
ble and cluster algorithms “tend to generate cluster-
ings even for fairly homogeneous data sets” (Hennig,
2007, p. 258). Therefore, we apply several conceptual
and methodological strategies to validate the cluster so-
lution in this study:
• A conceptual and theoretical validation: Do the
clusters found in the data correspond to our de-
ductively expected democracy profiles? This en-
sures that the cluster solution is not just a ran-
dom artefact but rather conforms to democracy
theory. For example, dowe find a cluster of democ-
racies which have a higher freedom than equality
or control dimension (libertarian and majoritarian
democracies)?
• Examination of the internal cluster quality us-
ing fit indices: Are the clusters similar to each
other and different to observations belonging to
other clusters? We refer here to the Silhouette
Width Criterion (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005).
Thereby, the “silhouette shows which objects lie
well within their cluster andwhich ones aremerely
somewhere in between clusters” (Kaufman &
Rousseeuw, 2005, p. 86). This fit index determines
whether the clusters are internally coherent and
well separated externally. It checks whether the
objects are close to their own cluster and do not
overlap with observations from other clusters. In
addition, the Average Silhouette Width has a clear
visualization in the form of the silhouette plot.
Values near 1 suggest that an observation is well
clustered; values near -1 shows that the observa-
tion is misclassified;
• Evaluation of the robustness of the cluster solution
using different cluster algorithms and resampling
procedures: If different cluster algorithms (e.g., hi-
erarchical vs. partitioning algorithms) identify the
same cluster solution, we can be reassured that
the cluster solutionwhichwas found is not random
but reliable. We compare the similarity of the clus-
ter solutionswith the Adjusted Rand Index (Hubert
& Arabie, 1985). It quantifies the level of agree-
ment between the cluster solutions corrected for
chance (0: no agreement; 1: perfect agreement).
Furthermore, we randomly partition the data by
using a nonparametric bootstrap method and ran-
domly subsetting 50% of the data to assess the
stability of the clusters over 100 resample runs
(Hennig, 2007).
For the clustering process itself, we chose a multi-step
clustering strategy (see Figure 2). As a result of an-
alyzing all democracies, that is both functioning and
deficient democracies at the same time, we may not
only find clusters of different dimensional shapes, but
we may also find that these shapes may be on over-
all different levels of democracy quality. There might
be egalitarian democracies—democracies with a higher
equality dimension relative to the freedom and con-
trol dimension—with overall low values for all dimen-
sions compared to egalitarian democracies which ex-
hibit higher values for all dimensions. To disentangle
the effects of shapes and levels in our analysis, we use
a correlation-based distance (Pearson correlation dis-
tance) in the first step. This distance classifies objects
as similar whose features are correlated, even if they
are at different levels (James et al., 2013, p. 396), which
means it groups observations based on the similarity
of their democracy profile (e.g., democracies which em-
phasize the freedom over the equality and control di-
mension regardless of the overall democratic quality of
these dimensions).
One drawback is that, unfortunately, the correlation-
based distance cannot determine whether the dimen-
sional values are actually balanced in the sense that
there is no difference between the dimensional values.
Even if there is only a minimal difference between the
dimensions, the correlation-based distance treats these
observations similarly to observations with larger differ-
ences between the dimensions. Therefore, we manually
extract these balanced configurations of the dimensions
and assign them to their own cluster with a balanced
shape (threshold for no difference between dimensions
is set to 0.05 points; the entire range for democratic val-
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Figure 2. Overview of clustering strategy.
ues is between 0.5 and 1). This also has the effect that we
only cluster those observations with a significant differ-
ence between the dimensions (greater than 0.05 points).
We use the following cluster algorithms and clus-
ter validation strategies. Firstly, we detect and eliminate
outliers which could adversely affect the clustering pro-
cess. This is especially important because the Pearson
correlation distance is prone to the effects of outliers.
A commonly-chosen outlier detection algorithm is a hier-
archical clustering algorithm with single linkage because
outliers “are left as singletons if they are sufficiently far
from their nearest neighbour” (Everitt et al., 2011, p. 81).
Secondly, we rely on divisive as opposed to agglom-
erative clustering. Divisive clustering (DIANA) groups the
data in a top-down direction in contrast to the bottom-
up direction of the agglomerative algorithm. This means
that the whole dataset is treated as a single cluster and
is split successively until each cluster contains only one
observation. It has several advantages over agglomera-
tive clustering, particularly the fact that it tends to par-
tition the data into a smaller number of clusters (Hastie
et al., 2009, p. 526). In addition, even though it shares the
weakness of all hierarchical clustering algorithms in that
the decision to split the data at an earlier stage cannot be
reversed, divisive clustering is generally considered to be
safer and more accurate (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005;
Sharma, López, & Tsunoda, 2017). The resulting dendro-
gram of the cluster solution visualizes the relationship
between the clusters in a tree-like diagram and is used
to identify the relevant number of clusters as a starting
point for the next algorithm to be applied.
Finally, we apply a second algorithm which does not
belong to the family of hierarchical clustering algorithms
but instead belongs to a group of partitioning cluster-
ing algorithms. The algorithm, Fuzzy Analysis (FANNY),
optimizes this solution while increasing its robustness.
Due to the empirical complexity, we do not expect the
clusters to be well separated. Hence, we allow for this
by using fuzzy instead of crisp clustering (D’Urso, 2015).
Instead of classifying an observation uniquely to only
one cluster, fuzzy clustering calculates for each observa-
tion the “strength of membership in all or some of the
clusters” (Everitt et al., 2011, p. 242). The strength of
the membership of an object can vary between 0 and
1 for each cluster (a high value of an object for a clus-
ter indicates a high probability that this object belongs
to that cluster). In addition, we compare the cluster so-
lution to agglomerative hierarchical clustering with the
average linkage which is a frequently chosen option in
other studies.
The cluster analysis is based on country-year obser-
vations. With this setting, it is easier to track the tem-
poral change in the democracy profile for each country.
However, the analysis has to ensure that a cluster is built,
not from years of a single country, but from a reasonable
number of countries.
The spatio-temporal range of this study is the follow-
ing: Since democracy profiles presuppose the existence
of a democratic regime, the observation must be classi-
fied as a democracy in order to be included in the sam-
ple. There are 3427 observations (country-years) classi-
fied as democracies in the Democracy Matrix dataset.
2906 cases have no missing values for the trade-off in-
dicators and can be included in the analyses. The analy-
sis covers all years from 1900 to 2017. The number of
included countries is 86 from all regions, the average of
years per country is 35 with a minimum of 1 year and
a maximum of 117 years (see Appendix, Section 1, for
more a detailed overview).
4. Results of the Cluster Analysis
In a first step, we split the dataset into two samples: One
sample with a balanced configuration of the three di-
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mensions, and one sample with an unbalanced configu-
ration. Only 493 country-years show a balanced profile
meaning that they show no or almost no differences be-
tween the three dimensions (40 countries with an aver-
age of 12 years per country). This balanced cluster does
not contradict the idea of trade-offs. Rather, this means
that some political systems do not occupy the extreme
ends of the trade-offs. The larger unbalanced sample
which shows differences between the three dimensions
is made up of 2413 country-years. Only these observa-
tions are subjected to cluster analysis in the next step.
The outlier detection via hierarchical clustering with sin-
gle linkage (see Appendix Figure A1) determines just
seven outliers (Latvia from 2006–2011; USA 1972–1973).
These outliers combine low freedom and low equality
with somewhat higher control values. After removing
those cases, divisive clustering is performed. The dendro-
gram (see Appendix Figure A2) shows that we can differ-
entiate between four clusters according to the height of
the branches and nodes.
These clusters correspond mostly to the conceptual
and theoretical considerations above (see Figure 3): We
find empirical evidence for the libertarian-majoritarian
democracy profile (Fec) which emphasizes higher free-
dom than equality and control values (e.g., United
Kingdom, Canada 1951–1973, New Zealand until 1995).
In addition, the results indicate the existence of an egal-
itarian-majoritarian profile (e.g., Netherlands, Sweden,
Spain). These democracies stress the equality dimen-
sion in contrast to the other two dimensions (fEc). We
also find empirical evidence for the controlled-focused
democracy profiles. High control values tend to go along
with higher freedom dimension representing a mix be-
tween a libertarian and controlled-focused democracy
(FeC, e.g., USA and Switzerland). In addition, high con-
trol valuesmix with higher egalitarian values (egalitarian-
controlled focused democracy, fEC, e.g., Germany and
Italy). The largest group are the egalitarian-majoritarian
democracies with 858 cases (51 countries with an aver-
age of 17 years per country) and the egalitarian-control-
focused countries with 652 observations (54 countries
with an average of 12 years per country). Lower obser-
vations are found for the libertarian-majoritarian pro-
file (440 cases—23 countries with 19 years on average)
and the libertarian-control-focused group (456 cases—
19 countries with 24 years on average).
Inspecting the internal cluster validity (see Figure 4),
we see that the average silhouette width is accept-
able (0.69). Each cluster has a silhouette width well
above the 0.5 threshold indicating a reasonable partition.
There are only a few negative silhouette widths within
the egalitarian-control-focused and the libertarian-
majoritarian cluster indicating a minor misfit for these
observations. The fuzzy clustering algorithm accounts
for those misfits by providing a lower membership prob-
ability of these observations to their clusters. Overall,
this means that most of the observations are near their
own cluster centre and most observations do not over-
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Figure 3. Boxplot of the cluster solution. Notes: N = 2899 country-years. This box plot shows the democratic quality for all
dimensions split by democracy profile (unbalanced and balanced configuration). Higher values indicate higher democratic
quality. The cluster distribution of countries and years is as follows: Fec: 23 countries (average years: 19); fEc: 51 countries
(average years: 17); FeC: 19 countries (average years: 24); fEC: 54 countries (average years: 12); FEC: 40 countries (average
years: 12). Source: Author’s calculations based on the Democracy Matrix dataset V1.1.
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Figure 4. Silhouette plots for the four cluster solution (FANNY). Notes: N = 2406 country-years. The silhouette plot shows
only the four unbalanced configurations. No cluster analysis was performed on the observations with a balanced configu-
ration. Therefore, no silhouette plot can be created for the balanced cluster. The plot shows the silhouette width (y-axis)
for each observation sorted by cluster (x-axis). The average silhouette width for each cluster is shown in bold within each
cluster. The overall average silhouette width is presented in the subtitle. Values near 1 indicate a very good clustering
result in the sense that observations are close to their own cluster and are well-separated from objects of other clusters.
Negative values signal a misfit so that the observation lies close to the observations from other cluster centres. Overall, the
values can be interpreted as follows (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005, p. 88): ≤ 0.25: no cluster structure; 0.26–0.50: weak
structure; 0.51–0.70: reasonable structure; 0.71–1.00: strong structure. Source: Author’s calculations with the dataset of
the Democracy Matrix V1.1.
lap with other clusters. Thus, the clusters are reasonably
compact and reasonable separated from each other.
The robustness of the cluster solution is reasonable
as well: The Adjusted Rand Index between the divisive
algorithm and the FANNY algorithm signals an excel-
lent agreement (Adjusted Rand Index: 0.83). However,
the FANNY solution and the cluster solution of the ag-
glomerative hierarchical clustering with average linkage
is a moderate 0.65. Nevertheless, visual inspection in
the form of boxplots (see Appendix Figure A3) makes
it clear that the agglomerative clustering with average
linkage recovers the four identical shapes, even though
the assignment of the observations to their specific clus-
ters varies. Finally, the bootstrap resampling method in-
dicates strong stability of all four clusters (Jaccard co-
efficients for each cluster > 0.95). All clusters can be
recovered by the cluster algorithms even if we ran-
domly vary some of the data or randomly drop 50% of
the observations.
5. Discussion: Temporal and Spatial Development of
Democracy Profiles
The temporal development of the democracy profiles
from 1900 to 2017 is shown in Figure 5. If we divide
this timeline according to the three waves of democracy
(Huntington, 1993), we see that every wave of democ-
racy has a distinct combination of democracy profiles:
In the first wave of democracy (until 1926), democracy
profiles emphasizing the freedomdimension (FeC or Fec)
dominated. In the second wave (1945–1962), egalitar-
ian democracies (either with a weak or strong control
dimension—fEc, fEC) complement this image. During this
wave, all democracy profiles coexisted at almost the
same rate. However, this drastically changed with the
third wave (since 1974). While libertarian democracy
profiles (Fec, FeC) almost disappeared, profiles emerged
which focused more on the equality dimension (fEc
and fEC). Especially countries which democratized after
1990 have opted for an egalitarian democracy profile. It
seems that egalitarian profiles are booming and libertar-
ian democracy profiles have gone out of fashion.
Figure 6 shows the spatial distribution of the democ-
racy profiles for the third wave of democracy. The coun-
tries are classified according to their longest lasting
democracy profile during this period. On the one hand,
the majority of democracy profiles in North America and
South America are control-focused democracies. The
USA combines the control-dimension with a more pro-
nounced freedom dimension (FeC), whereas the coun-
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Figure 5. Temporal distribution of democracy profiles: count (left); percent (right). Source: Author’s calculations with the
dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.
tries in South America show higher control and equal-
ity values (fEC). On the other hand, Europe has a mix
of egalitarian-majoritarian (fEc) and egalitarian-control-
focused democracies (fEC). The United Kingdom is the ex-
ception, as it is the only libertarian-majoritarian democ-
racy in Europe (Fec). Similar to the finding by Lijphart,
Britain seemed to have transferred its libertarian democ-
racy profile to some of its former colonies. They either
have the same profile (Fec: Botswana, New Zealand,
Solomon Islands) or a very similar profile (FeC: Trinidad
and Tobago, Sri Lanka, Australia). However, there are also
exceptions to this rule (FEC: India).
Finally, this new typology allows the development of
democracy profiles for individual countries to be tracked.
Figure 7 shows this development for four selected coun-
tries after 1945. The United Kingdom is an example of
a political system with a very stable democracy pro-
file. For instance, the United Kingdom never changed its
libertarian-majoritarian profile: The freedomdimensions
is favoured by a highly disproportional electoral system,
“no limits of the total expenditure of and donations to
political parties” (Smilov, 2008, p. 14) at least until 2000,
no judicial review and no divided government as well as
a weak second chamber. In addition, some of those char-
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Figure 6. Spatial distribution of democracy profiles (1945–2017). Notes: World map shows the mode of the democracy
profiles for each country in the period between 1945 and 2017. The mode is the value which appears the most in a set of
values. Grey indicates that the democracy profile is not available because data is missing or the country is not classified as
a democracy. Source: Author’s calculations with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.
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Figure 7. Temporal development of the democracy profile for single countries after 1945. Source: Author’s calculations
with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.
acteristics have changed partially since 2000. The cluster
analysis, however, does not change its classification.
There are also countries with minor changes.
Germany remains an egalitarian-control-focused democ-
racy most of the time. It only shifts towards a more
egalitarian-majoritarian democracy after the parliamen-
tary elections in 2002. However, the membership prob-
ability shows that there is a high chance (48%) that it
still belongs to the fEC cluster. Nevertheless, Germany’s
democracy profile can be seen as the opposite of the
United Kingdom’s democracy profile. PR (also with a 5%
threshold which make it majoritarian in some cases like
2013where two parties fell just below the 5% hurdle), an
egalitarian party finance systemand egalitarianmedia ac-
cess model strengthen the equality dimension, whereas
a rather strong second chamber in combination with a
strong constitutional court favour the control dimension.
These institutional decisions are at the expense of the
freedom dimension.
Finally, there are political systems whose democ-
racy profile has changed drastically: New Zealand was
first a libertarian-majoritarian democracy and changed
to an egalitarian-majoritarian profile in 1996 with the
electoral reform from a First-Past-the-Post system to
Proportional Representation. Switzerland established a
balanceddemocracy profile in 1972. Thiswas causedby a
change in the qualitymeasuring indicators rather than by
trade-off indicators. Switzerland introduced woman suf-
frage in 1971 and changed from a deficient democracy
to a working democracy.
6. Conclusion
Based on the work by Lauth and Schlenkrich (2018a), we
have shown how to conceptually link trade-offs between
dimensions with democracy profiles: From a democracy
theory perspective, a perfect democracy seems impos-
sible, a complete realization of all three key democ-
racy dimensions—freedom, equality, and control—is
unattainable. The tensions between dimensions mani-
fest themselves in institutional choices andwe have iden-
tified two opposing pairs of profiles: libertarian vs. egal-
itarian democracy, as well as majoritarian vs. control-
focused democracy.
In this article, we have drawn important conclu-
sions. A cluster analysis with a strong focus on clus-
ter validation revealed that we can indeed find these
deductively derived profiles. Based on the Democracy
Matrix dataset—a customized version of the Varieties-
of-Democracy dataset—we find empirical evidence for
a libertarian-majoritarian democracy cluster (high polit-
ical freedom values; lower values for political equality,
and political and legal control) and an egalitarian- ma-
joritarian democracy cluster (high equality, less freedom
and control). In addition, we find mixed control-focused
clusters: High control values are associated either with
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 315–330 325
higher freedom or higher equality levels (the libertarian-
control-focused and the egalitarian-control-focused clus-
ter respectively). Finally, there is a smaller balanced clus-
ter whose dimensional values do not vary.
Furthermore, we have shown that each wave of
democracy has its own characteristic distribution of
democracy profiles. In the first wave, libertarian democ-
racies (either with majoritarian or control-focused fea-
tures) dominated. The second wave presented a mixed
picture, meaning that all profiles of democracy were
more or less equally represented. The thirdwave showed
that egalitarian democracy profiles (either with majori-
tarian or control-focused features) gained the upper
hand. Referring to the spatial distribution, there is a con-
centration of control-focused democracies in North and
South America, whereas a stronger mix of democracy
profiles exists in Europe. An exception seems to be the
United Kingdom with its libertarian-majoritarian democ-
racy profile. We also discussed cases where the democ-
racy profile was mostly stable over the whole period
from 1945 to 2017 (United Kingdom, Germany) as well
as countries where there was a significant change (New
Zealand and Switzerland). Further research is warranted:
What are the causes for these specific democracy pro-
files? What causes them to change? Lastly, what are the
consequences of these democracy profiles on the perfor-
mance of these countries (e.g., in terms of economic de-
velopment, economic inequality)?
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Appendix
1. List of Countries included in the Cluster Analysis
Albania (13), Argentina (26), Australia (117), Austria (1), Belgium (107), Benin (1), Bosnia and Herzegovina (14), Botswana
(52), Brazil (19), Bulgaria (19), Burkina Faso (1), Canada (97), Cape Verde (22), Chile (13), Colombia (2), Costa Rica (65),
Croatia (11), Cyprus (23), Czech Republic (47), Denmark (114), Estonia (40), Fiji (6), Finland (77), France (97), Georgia (6),
Germany (69), Ghana (3), Greece (43), Guyana (3), Hungary (27), Iceland (83), India (64), Indonesia (6), Ireland (29), Israel
(67), Italy (70), Jamaica (25), Japan (62), Latvia (28), Liberia (1), Lithuania (17), Luxembourg (94), Macedonia (5), Mauritius
(49), Moldova (6), Mongolia (7), Montenegro (5), Namibia (24), Nepal (4), Netherlands (107), New Zealand (107), Norway
(24), Panama (24), Peru (10), Poland (31), Portugal (32), Romania (8), São Tomé and Príncipe (15), Senegal (28), Serbia (8),
Seychelles (8), Slovakia (16), Slovenia (3), Solomon Islands (1), South Africa (19), South Korea (3), Spain (40), Sri Lanka (30),
Suriname (3), Sweden (101), Switzerland (99), Tanzania (10), Timor-Leste (8), Trinidad and Tobago (52), Tunisia (4), Turkey
(6), United Kingdom (98), United States of America (94), Uruguay (65), Vanuatu (34), Venezuela (36), Zambia (1).
The number in brackets is the number of years each country occurs in the sample. This shows that there are missing
cases, especially for Austria and Norway. This list shows all countries that are classified as a democracy according to the
context measurement of the Democracy Matrix (see Lauth & Schlenkrich, 2018a). The Democracy Matrix classifies an
observation as a democracy if all institutional and dimensional values are above the threshold of 0.5.
2. List of Countries per Cluster
The number in the parenthesis is the number of years the country occurs in the cluster.
Fec: Australia (8), Belgium (18), Botswana (52), Canada (22), Czech Republic (13), Denmark (2), Guyana (1), Iceland (49),
India (23), Ireland (6), Jamaica (2), Japan (13), Latvia (4), Luxembourg (1), Namibia (4), Netherlands (4), New Zealand (82),
São Tomé and Príncipe (3), Solomon Islands (1), Sri Lanka (10), Sweden (28), Trinidad and Tobago (7), United Kingdom (87).
fEc:Albania (1), Argentina (14), Australia (12), Austria (1), Belgium (51), Benin (1), Bosnia andHerzegovina (14), Bulgaria
(13), Burkina Faso (1), Canada (18), Cape Verde (20), Costa Rica (8), Croatia (3), Cyprus (15), Czech Republic (18), Denmark
(33), Estonia (17), Fiji (6), Finland (37), France (23), Georgia (5), Germany (15), Greece (35), Guyana (2), Hungary (14),
Iceland (29), Ireland (3), Japan (12), Lithuania (10), Luxembourg (92), Mongolia (5), Montenegro (1), Namibia (20), Nether-
lands (85), New Zealand (25), Norway (6), Panama (5), Poland (19), Portugal (25), Romania (6), São Tomé and Príncipe (3),
Senegal (6), Serbia (8), Slovakia (6), South Africa (2), Spain (38), Suriname (3), Sweden (51), Tanzania (9), Timor-Leste (8),
Vanuatu (3).
FeC: Argentina (11), Australia (73), Belgium (38), Canada (30), Chile (4), Denmark (15), France (38), Iceland (2), India (3),
Jamaica (7), Latvia (10), Netherlands (17), Sri Lanka (12), Sweden (20), Switzerland (60), Trinidad and Tobago (33), United
Kingdom (11), United States of America (69), Uruguay (3).
fEC: Albania (11), Argentina (1), Australia (5), Brazil (19), Bulgaria (6), Canada (1), Chile (7), Colombia (2), Costa Rica
(43), Croatia (6), Cyprus (3), Czech Republic (16), Denmark (16), Estonia (8), Finland (17), France (7), Georgia (1), Germany
(54), Ghana (3), Greece (2), India (15), Indonesia (6), Israel (67), Italy (55), Jamaica (1), Japan (1), Latvia (6), Lithuania
(4), Luxembourg (1), Mauritius (21), Moldova (6), Mongolia (2), Montenegro (4), Nepal (4), Netherlands (1), Norway (18),
Panama (15), Peru (7), Portugal (7), Senegal (22), Slovakia (10), Slovenia (3), South Africa (17), South Korea (1), Spain (2),
Sri Lanka (1), Tanzania (1), Tunisia (4), Turkey (4), United States of America (17), Uruguay (46), Vanuatu (18), Venezuela
(36), Zambia (1).
FEC: Albania (1), Australia (19), Canada (26), Cape Verde (2), Chile (2), Costa Rica (14), Croatia (2), Cyprus (5), Denmark
(48), Estonia (15), Finland (23), France (29), Greece (6), Hungary (13), Iceland (3), India (23), Ireland (20), Italy (15), Jamaica
(15), Japan (36), Latvia (3), Liberia (1), Lithuania (3), Macedonia (5), Mauritius (28), Panama (4), Peru (3), Poland (12),
Romania (2), São Tomé and Príncipe (8), Seychelles (8), South Korea (2), Sri Lanka (7), Sweden (2), Switzerland (39), Trinidad
and Tobago (12), Turkey (2), United States of America (6), Uruguay (16), Vanuatu (13).
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3. Figures
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Figure A1. Hierarchical clustering with single linkage. Note: N= 2413 country-years. Source: Author’s calculations with the
dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.
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Figure A2. Dendrogram of the divisive clustering. Note: N = 2406 country-years. Source: Author’s calculations with the
dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.
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Figure A3. Boxplot of the agglomerative hierarchical clustering with average linkage. Notes: N = 2406 country-years. This
box plot shows the democratic quality for all dimensions split by democracy profile. The balanced configuration is not
included because these observations are not subjected to the cluster analysis. Higher values indicate higher democratic
quality. Author’s calculations with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.
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